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INTRODUCTION
In many ways, the Supreme Court's opinion in E Hoffmann-LaRoche,
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.' raised more questions than it answered. Growing out
* J.D. candidate, May 2007. Many thanks to Professor Thomas Kauper, and also to Jeanne
Long, Khalil Maalouf, Krista Caner, Joel Flaxman, Ilya Shulman, Andrew Goetz, and Liz Ryan:
your comments on previous drafts are much appreciated, and your dedication and excellent work as
colleagues in the Notes Office have been invaluable. I also wish to thank my loving and supportive
family, and I especially thank my fianc6e, Maggie Aisenbrey, who browbeat and motivated me to
finish this piece.
1. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
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of the massive international vitamins cartel uncovered in the 1990s, 2 Empa-
gran presented a scenario in which all parties were foreign and all conduct
occurred abroad.3 Although it is "well established by now that the Sherman
Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States, 4 Empagran presented
the Court with the first truly foreign antitrust case. It involved not only for-
eign conduct, but also foreign plaintiffs complaining of injuries suffered
abroad at the hands of foreign defendants The case therefore appeared to
present thorny questions about the proper construction of the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 ("FTAIA") 6 and the extent of the
Sherman Act's extraterritorial application.7
Instead of seizing this opportunity to clarify and definitively outline the
extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act, the Court carefully circumscribed
its opinion to address only a particular and narrow subset of claims: those of
foreign plaintiffs alleging an injury that arose independently from the injury
inflicted upon the domestic market." Although the Court denied jurisdiction
to such independent claims, it noted that the Empagran plaintiffs were also
advancing a theory in which "the anticompetitive conduct's domestic effects
were linked to that foreign harm."9 Under this theory, the cartel's global
scope and the fungible, easily transportable nature of vitamins meant that
"without an adverse domestic effect (i.e., higher prices in the United States),
the sellers could not have maintained their international price-fixing ar-
rangement and [plaintiffs] would not have suffered their foreign injury."'
2. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724) (noting
that cartel participants paid $900 million in fines to the United States government, along with civil
penalties outside the U.S. exceeding €855 million and civil settlements exceeding $2 billion).
3. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 160 (stating that "the question presented assumes that the
relevant 'transactions occur[ed] entirely outside U.S. commerce' "); see also Question Presented,
Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/03-00724qp.pdf (stating
that "[tihe question presented is as follows: Whether plaintiffs may pursue Sherman Act claims
seeking recovery for injuries sustained in transactions occurring entirely outside U.S. commerce").
4. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
5. The Court in Empagran seemed particularly careful in repeatedly referencing foreign
plaintiffs, possibly suggesting that its holding-denying jurisdiction for such foreign plaintiffs'
claims for injuries suffered abroad-would not apply to curtail the ability of U.S. citizens to sue for
injuries sustained abroad. This nationality wrinkle, however, is beyond the scope of this Note, which
will consider only the arguments relating to the availability of jurisdiction over the claims of foreign
plaintiffs, the central issue in Empagran and a number of other recent cases.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
7. See Empagran S.A. v. F Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F3d 338, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(stating that the case required interpreting the FTAIA "to determine the jurisdictional reach of the
federal antitrust laws").
8. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175 (stating that "[wie have assumed that the anticompetitive
conduct here independently caused foreign injury").
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. Id.
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The Court therefore remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit with instructions
to consider the viability of this theory in the first instance."
This Note analyzes how courts and commentators have evaluated this
"linked global conspiracy"' 2 theory that Empagran expressly left unre-
solved. Part I discusses the early, pre-Empagran decisions that struggled to
make sense of both these claims and the FTAIA, a statute that one court de-
scribed as "inelegantly phrased."'3 Part I then details the resulting circuit
split that led to Empagran and analyzes the decision itself. Part II examines
the developments following Empagran and charts courts' increasingly
overwhelming rejection of these linked global conspiracy claims, with the
D.C. Circuit's June 2005 decision in Empagran S.A. v. F Hoffinann-
LaRoche, Ltd. (Empagran 1) 14 leading the way. Part III then argues that this
growing consensus against finding jurisdiction is incorrect. It contends that
these decisions rely on little more than conclusory labels-terms such as
"but-for" and "proximate cause." Part III also argues that the FTAIA's legis-
lative history suggests that Congress did intend to confer jurisdiction in
linked global cartel cases. Even if these cases ultimately do not belong in
U.S. courts, there are more proper paths to their ouster, such as finding a
lack of antitrust standing. Finally, Part III contends that in limited circum-
stances courts should find that foreign plaintiffs meet the requirements for
both jurisdiction and antitrust standing.
I. THE "INELEGANTLY PHRASED" FTAIA, A BATTLE IN THE
CIRCUITS OVER AN INDEFINITE ARTICLE, AND EMPAGRAN
Although Congress passed the FTAIA in 1982, largely to address percep-
tions that fear of antitrust liability was hindering American exporters in
competing abroad against rivals unconstrained by competition laws in their
own countries, 5 the statute did not play a major part in antitrust litigation until
recently. In the 1990s, "as the Antitrust Division intensified its enforcement
11. id.
12. This Note will use the term "linked global conspiracy" or "linked global cartel" to refer
to such claims. This Note will also analyze almost exclusively cases in which plaintiffs have alleged
that the defendants engaged in global price-fixing cartels. Such cases seem both far more common
and better suited to meeting the FTAIA's jurisdictional requirements. Cases presenting different
antitrust claims are considered only briefly, or not at all. See infra note 65.
13. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997).
14. 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 4 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2489
("'It is an article of orthodoxy in the business community that the antitrust laws stand as an im-
pediment to the international competitive performance of the United States . .. [and] that the
antitrust laws hinder our export performance' ") (quoting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
John Shenefield); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Empagran: What Next?, 58 SMU
L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2005) ("To address this perceived inequity, the FTAIA exempted export trans-
actions from antitrust scrutiny,. except if there was a 'direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect' on United States foreign commerce, as well as transactions that were wholly foreign."). The
House Report also mentioned a second purpose of resolving "possible ambiguity in the precise legal
standard to be employed in determining whether American antitrust law is to be applied to a particu-
lar transaction." H.R. REP. No. 97-686, supra, at 5, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2489.
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efforts against international cartels that, in turn, spawned private treble-
damages actions against foreign defendants,"'16 the statute assumed a new
prominence and a new role. Private follow-on actions, relating to prosecuted
conspiracies involving heavy-lift marine barge services, international auc-
tion services, and vitamins, forced the Fifth,17 Second,8 and D.C. Circuit
Courts of Appeals,' 9 respectively, to weigh in on how exactly Congress in-
tended the FTAIA to affect federal courts' jurisdiction over anticompetitive
conduct occurring abroad.
As Judge Selya aptly observed in United States v. Nippon Paper Indus-20
tries Co., the FTAIA is not a model of clarity.2' The FTAIA provides that:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title [the Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct
involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce)
with foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable ef-
fect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign na-
tions [i.e., domestic trade or commerce], or on import trade or import
commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States [i.e., on an Ameri-
can export competitor]; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7
22of this title, other than this section.
As the Supreme Court noted, the FTAIA first sets out a general rule
placing all non-import activity involving foreign commerce beyond the
Sherman Act's reach.23 It then returns such conduct to the scope of the
Sherman Act, but only if (1) the conduct has a "direct, substantial and rea-
sonably foreseeable effect" on American domestic or import commerce, and
(2) the conduct's effect "gives rise to a [Sherman Act] claim. 24 In other
words, the Sherman Act only applies to conduct occurring abroad if that
conduct exerts a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on US
commerce.
16. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 1423.
17. See Den Norske Stats OljeselskapAs v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
18. See Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
19. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
20. 109 F.3d 1 (1 st Cir. 1997).
21. Id. at 4 (describing the statute as "inelegantly phrased"); see also Empagran, 315 F.3d at
341 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("We can find no 'plain meaning' in § 6a(2) of FrAIA.").
22. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000); see also F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542
U.S. 155, 161-62 (2004) (quoting the statutory language and adding material bracketed in text).
23. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000).
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Prior to Empagran, the contested questions were just who could bring
such a claim and what kind of relation that person's claim would need to
have to the domestic effect of the defendants' conduct. These questions re-
quired carefully interpreting § 6a(2), and specifically the phrase "gives rise
to a claim." The first court of appeals to confront these questions was the
Fifth Circuit, in Den Norske Stats Oljeselkap As v. HeereMac v.o.f.23 In
HeereMac, the court concluded "that a foreign plaintiff injured in a foreign
marketplace must show that a substantial domestic effect on United States
commerce 'gives rise' to its antitrust claim. ' 26 Next came the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Kruman v. Christie's International PLC,2 7 which adopted a
very different approach. Because "Congress used the indefinite article ('a')
rather than the definite article ('the')," the Second Circuit held that the stat-
ute should not be read as "requir[ing] that the 'effect give[] rise to the
plaintiff's claim.' ,2' Finally, the D.C. Circuit sided with the Second Circuit's
expansive reading in Kruman, ruling in Empagran that the words "a claim"
meant merely that "the conduct's harmful effect on United States commerce
must give rise to 'a claim' by someone, even if not the foreign plaintiff who
is before the court."29 Therefore, the court held that "where the anticompeti-
tive conduct has the requisite harm on United States commerce, FTAIA
permits suits by foreign plaintiffs who are injured solely by that conduct's
effect on foreign commerce."0 The situation was ripe for the Supreme Court
to resolve.
Despite the seemingly narrow and hyper-technical nature of the circuit
split, disagreeing about the import of a single indefinite article in a cryptic
statute,3' the issues at stake were much broader. The case appeared to pre-
sent the Court squarely with questions about the extent of the Sherman Act's
extraterritorial application. Indeed, when the Court granted certiorari, the
question presented asked "[w]hether plaintiffs may pursue Sherman Act
claims seeking recovery for injuries sustained in transactions occurring en-
tirely outside U.S. commerce. 32 The Court seemed set to pronounce the
definitive word on a difficult issue that had proven vexing to U.S. courts for
roughly a century.3 3
25. 241 E3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
26. Id. at 428-29 (emphasis added).
27. 284 E3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
28. Id. at 400 (parentheses in original).
29. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
30. Id.
31. See Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? U.S. Jurisdiction
Over International Cartels, 72 U. CH. L. REv. 265, 273-74 (2005) (describing the circuit split as a
debate over whether "'a claim' mean[s] 'any claim,' or 'the plaintiff's claim' ").
32. Question Presented at 1, F. Hoffmann La-Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155
(2004) (No. 03-724), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/03-00724qp.pdf.
33. As the Fifth Circuit observed in HeereMac, "the federal courts have generally disagreed
as to the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws and have employed assorted tests to determine the
scope of the Sherman Act[, and] this body of case law is confusing and unsettled." Den Norske Stats
February 2007]
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When the Court then issued its narrowly crafted opinion in Empagran-
restricting the scope of its holding, denying jurisdiction, to cases alleging
independently caused foreign injuries-it therefore not only dashed hopes
for greater clarification in this area, but potentially sowed yet more confu-
sion. In taking such care to limit the reach of its holding, the Court avoided
one of the thornier issues implicated in the case, which it remanded for the
D.C. Circuit to consider in the first instance. 34 That issue was how to treat
claims asserting a linked global conspiracy in a fungible, easily transport-
able commodity. In such linked global conspiracies, the cartel's successful
operation requires maintaining a worldwide conspiracy such that plaintiffs
might argue that their injuries abroad were connected to and caused by the
effects of the conspiracy upon domestic commerce.
The Court took great care to "reemphasize" that its holding, denying ju-
risdiction, was confined to a scenario in which "price-fixing conduct
significantly and adversely affects both customers outside the United States
and customers within the United States, but the adverse foreign effect is in-
dependent of any adverse domestic effect."35 Indeed, the Court used
"independent" to modify injury, harm, effect, or cause at least twenty-four
times in an opinion spanning approximately twenty U.S. Reporter pages.36 If
nothing else, it seemed the Court clearly intended to communicate that its
opinion had not decided the fate of claims alleging interlinked global con-
spiracies. Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that Empagran
contained a clear "blueprint" for how the D.C. Circuit should rule on re-
mand and that the Court's refusal to decide the global conspiracy issue
"more likely" stemmed from the Court "simply giving the D.C. Circuit a
roadmap to correct its error and save face."
3 7
Whether or not the critics are correct, on its face Empagran simply held
that the FTAIA denied subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act to
foreign plaintiffs complaining of an independently caused foreign injury.
Invoking what it termed principles of "prescriptive comity" as one of the
"main reasons" for its holding, the Court advocated a cautionary approach
when "constru[ing] ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations."3"
Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 423-24, 424 n.12 (5th Cir. 2001) (tracing the
history of this unsettled issue through Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909),
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), Am.
Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Co-op., 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983), and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993)).
34. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175.
35. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
36. See generally id.
37. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 1437 (referring to remarks by former Assistant Attorney
General John Shenefield).
38. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164. The Court's comity discussion, however, was not entirely
persuasive. Traditionally, Courts have viewed comity and jurisdiction as different things, with com-
ity serving as a discretionary tool allowing courts to evaluate international concerns on a case-by-
case basis and to abstain from exercising jurisdiction when appropriate, a distinction the Court ac-
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The Court also addressed concerns about deterrence, which played a
leading role not only in plaintiffs-respondents' arguments and in the D.C.
Circuit's decision, but also in the briefs of various amici arguing in support
of reversal." Plaintiffs and the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the added deter-
rence from accepting such foreign plaintiffs' claims would "help protect
Americans against foreign-caused anticompetitive injury." Meanwhile, the
United States and numerous other governments submitted amici briefs argu-
ing that allowing foreign plaintiffs to assert claims alleging foreign injuries
could result in over-deterrence and threaten the effectiveness of their cartel-
detection and enforcement activities .4  Over-deterrence could impair their
various amnesty and leniency programs, which typically offer criminal am-
nesty to the "first party through the door ' 42 but which also guarantee an
ensuing parade of civil plaintiffs claiming treble damages. 43 Allowing suits
from foreign purchasers would simply swell the ranks of those civil plain-
tiffs, altering the calculus of risks for cartel members debating whether to
avail themselves of leniency policies. Confronting this heated dispute, the
Court essentially declared the question to be an empirical matter beyond its
competence."
Having thus disposed of claims asserting independently caused foreign
injury, the Court finally turned to the truly central issue in the case: global
knowledged. See id. at 168. The Court nonetheless determined that comity considerations, although
normally a matter of judicial discretion to withdraw jurisdiction from cases otherwise properly
brought before them, would be "too complex to prove workable" in the antitrust context because
antitrust claims are often of a "legally and economically technical nature." Id.
Although national competition laws certainly differ in many respects, prohibitions against
price-fixing and "hardcore" cartels are nearly universal. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23-24,
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., No. 05-541 (Oct. 26, 2005), 2005 WL 2844943. What-
ever worries the Court had about complex and unworkable case-by-case comity analyses in less
clear or universally recognized antitrust violations should have carried little weight in Empagran,
perhaps one of the biggest and most blatant cartels of all time. After all, the Court could simply have
adopted a comity-informed interpretation of the FITAIA that treated the extraterritorial scope of the
Sherman Act somewhat differently depending on the nature of the violation alleged, or simply fol-
lowed the more traditional notion of comity as a discretionary tool apart from the jurisdictional
determination. See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[Clomity consid-
erations ... were properly understood not as questions of whether a United States court possessed
subject matter jurisdiction, but instead as issues of whether such a court should decline to exercise
the jurisdiction that it possessed.").
39. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168 (citing briefs filed by the governments of the Federal
Republic of Germany, Canada, and the United States).
40. Id. at 174.
41. See id. at 169, 174.
42. See, e.g., ANTITRUST Div., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY 2 (1993),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm (providing for leniency under
various required conditions, including that "[t]he corporation is the first one to come forward [to the
Department] ... with respect to the illegal activity being reported").
43. But see Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement & Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-237, tit. lI, subtit. A, §§ 213-14, 118 Stat. 661, 666-68 (de-trebling damage liability for suc-
cessful applicants to the Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Policy). In the wake of this new
legislation, passed just weeks after the Court's decision in Empagran, such concerns about over-
deterrence may no longer be as relevant.
44. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 174-75.
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conspiracy claims in which the foreign "anticompetitive conduct's domestic
effects were linked to [the] foreign harm., 45 The Court simply noted that
plaintiffs were advancing an alternative linked global conspiracy theory-
envisioning a global cartel where, without the harmful effect on U.S. com-
merce, the defendants could not have maintained their global price-fixing
cartel and plaintiffs would not have suffered their foreign injury-and de-
clined to address that theory.46 Instead, the Court stated that "[t]he Court of
Appeals may determine whether [plaintiffs] properly preserved the argu-
ment, and, if so, it may consider it and decide" the issue.
The Court's parry, postponing the resolution of how to treat foreign inju-
ries resulting from linked global cartels, left several commentators
frustrated. One declared that "[t]his case about world cartels is a world class
puzzlement, ' 4s and another described the decision as "somewhat mystify-
ing.' 4 Another scholar concluded that while "Empagran made abundantly
clear that the United States is not the antitrust police force of the world,"
because the "Court declined to address whether foreign plaintiffs may in-
voke the Sherman Act when a market is truly global[, c]ourts will now have
to develop a workable definition of 'intertwined effects' for today's interde-
pendent world economy."' As this Note's next Part will demonstrate,
however, in the wake of Empagran courts have almost uniformly ignored
this task and failed to do anything more than reflexively dismiss such linked
global conspiracy cases.
II. THE EMERGING POST-EMPAGRAN CONSENSUS: GLOBAL
CONSPIRACY THEORIES FLUNK A PROXIMATE CAUSE TEST
Because Empagran explicitly left open the question of how to analyze
claims asserting linked global conspiracies, several courts have already had
to confront and answer this question. Although the early results suggested
the possibility of another round of divided courts, 2005 and the first half of
2006 have seen an avalanche of cases and commentary adopting an anti-
jurisdiction position, including one court that reconsidered and reversed its
45. Id. at 175.
46. Id.
47. Id. Of course, while the Empagran plaintiffs had not argued the global cartel theory
before the court of appeals, the plaintiffs in Den Norske and Kruman seem to have done so. See
Wolfgang Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and the Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of U.S. Antitrust Law, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 205, 225 (2005) (noting that
the auction market in Kruman was "truly global because sellers and buyers are the same worldwide"
and that the "same can be assumed in Den Norske [which] concerned services for heavy lift barges;
only seven existed and they were deployed worldwide").
48. Ronald W. Davis, Empagran and International Cartels-A Comity of Errors, ANTI-
TRUST, Fall 2004, at 58, 58.
49. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 1430.
50. Wurmnest, supra note 47, at 227.
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own earlier pro-jurisdiction ruling.5' This Part will briefly examine the rele-
vant cases and analyze their reasoning, with Section II.A detailing the early
cases and Section II.B discussing the D.C. Circuit's decision on remand in
Empagran H and the emerging anti-jurisdiction consensus. Part III will then
criticize this consensus and offer a different view.
A. The Early Returns: Opening the Door to Linked
Global Conspiracy Claims?
Roughly two months after the Court decided Empagran, a trio of courts
issued decisions addressed to claims asserting that a linked global conspir-
acy theory sufficiently connected plaintiffs' foreign injuries to the foreign
anticompetitive conduct's effect on the domestic market, thereby meeting
the requirements for jurisdiction. All three decisions--Sniado v. Bank Aus-
tria AG,52 BHP New Zealand Ltd. v. UCAR International, Inc.," and MM
Global Services. v. The Dow Chemical Co.--rendered results that appeared
to favor plaintiffs. Two offered outright support to such claims. While the
other case denied jurisdiction, it contained language generally favorable to
plaintiffs in linked global cartel cases.
That other case was Sniado, the first of the trio to be decided, and two
aspects of the decision appear favorable to linked global conspiracy claims
even though the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over this particular
plaintiff's claims.55 The plaintiff's linked global conspiracy claim in Sniado
was both rather farfetched and raised for the first time only after the Su-
56preme Court's opinion in Empagran. Whether Sniado should even be read
as truly rejecting a linked global conspiracy claim as a basis for jurisdiction
is questionable, given that the case involved an exceptionally weak, and pos-
sibly not good-faith, version of theory.5 7 Sniado's complaint alleged that a
price-fixing conspiracy among European banks forced him to pay, in
Europe, supra-competitive fees to exchange Euro-zone currencies.58 The
Second Circuit noted that his complaint did not "allege that currency ex-
change fees in the United States reached supra-competitive levels, nor that
but for the European conspiracy's effect on United States commerce, he
51. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. 00MDL1328, 2005 WL 2810682
(D. Minn. Oct 26, 2005) (granting defendant's Motion to Reconsider the court's earlier ruling, No.
Civ. 00MDL1328, 2005 WL 1080790 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005)).
52. 378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004) (decided Aug. 5, 2004).
53. 106 Fed. App'x. 138 (3d Cir. 2004) (decided Aug. 9, 2004).
54. 329 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D. Conn. 2004) (decided Aug. 11, 2004).
55. Sniado, 378 F.3d at 213 (finding that the "amended complaint is facially insufficient to
establish jurisdiction").
56. Id. at 212 (noting that "Sniado raises this alternative theory for the first time on remand
from the Supreme Court").
57. Of course, at least one anti-jurisdiction commentator has seized on Sniado as illustrating
another example of the anti-jurisdiction position. See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 1437.
58. Sniado, 378 F.3d at 212.
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would not have been injured in Europe. '59 Sniado's complaint thus lacked
any allegations of a negative effect upon U.S. commerce, and his theory
bears only superficial resemblance to the linked global cartel theories found
in other cases discussed in this Note. In addition, Sniado appears relatively
favorable to linked global cartel claims in that the Second Circuit discussed
causation simply in terms of a "but for" relationship: in finding that
Sniado's allegations did not meet a "but for" causation standard,60 the court
gave no indication that it would require a more stringent, proximate causa-
tion standard.61
The other two early cases, BHP and MM Global Services, both reached
results more generally favorable to plaintiffs and maintained the possibility
of jurisdiction for global conspiracy claims. In BHP, the Third Circuit noted
plaintiffs' argument that Empagran had left open the question of whether
jurisdiction existed where plaintiffs could make "a preliminary showing ...
that the prices they paid [abroad] for graphite electrodes were linked to, and
not 'independent' from, the raising of prices in the United States by defen-
dants' alleged global price-fixing cartel. 62 The court then remanded the case
to the district court, stating that "[t]he District Court, should it deem it nec-
essary or helpful, may give the parties the opportunity to present evidence as
to whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct's domestic effects were
linked to the alleged foreign harm., 63 The Third Circuit could have declared
that assertions of such a linked global conspiracy simply failed to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of the FTAIA. Its willingness to allow plaintiffs
a chance to develop a factual record to support their claims, therefore, seems
mildly supportive. After remand, the parties settled in April 2006, following
oral argument on motions to dismiss. 6" The last of the three early cases, MM
Global Services, offered a full victory to plaintiffs asserting a slightly modi-
59. Id. at 213.
60. Black's Law Dictionary defines "but-for cause" as "[tihe cause without which the event
could not have occurred" and defines "proximate cause" as a "cause that is legally sufficient to
result in liability; an act or omission that is considered in law to result in a consequence, so that
liability can be imposed on the actor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (8th ed. 2004).
61. See Sniado, 378 F.3d 210. Of course, Sniado did not adopt any specific causation stan-
dard, and the Second Circuit could still have adopted a proximate cause standard in a later case.
That the court never once referenced proximate cause and discussed causation purely in "but-for"
terms offers at least some indication that the court viewed the causation inquiry at the jurisdiction
stage in "but for" terms.
62. BHP N.Z. Ltd. v. Ucar Int'l, Inc., 106 Fed. App'x. 138, 142-43 (3d Cir. 2004).
63. Id. at 143.
64. E-mail from James Martin, Attomey for All Plaintiffs-Appellants in BHP N.Z. Ltd. v.
Ucar Int'l, Inc., Nos. 01-3329, 01-3340, & 01-3991, to Author (Oct. 1, 2006, 15:28:51 EDT) (on file
with author). During that oral argument, Judge Shapiro seemed receptive to the linked global cartel
theory and skeptical of the growing anti-jurisdiction trend. Transcript of Oral Argument at 61-64, In
re Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation, No: 2:10-md-1244-NS (E.D. Pa. argued Apr. 3, 2006)
("[Tihere's strength to [the linked global cartel] argument, it's very understandable.... I found the
[D.C. C]ircuit court['s] analysis of but for and proximate cause somewhat confusing.") (on file with
author).
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fled interlinked global theory.65 Judge Covello of the District of Connecticut
"conclude[d] that the plaintiffs have sufficiently satisfied the requirements
of the FTAIA" and "the court had subject matter jurisdiction" to hear the
linked global cartel claim.66
After these opinions, no court rendered a decision on this issue for
nearly nine months, until May 2005, when Judge Magnuson of the District
of Minnesota embraced a linked global conspiracy theory in In re Monoso-
dium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation (MSG 1).f" Noting both the plaintiffs'
linked global conspiracy argument and that the Supreme Court's Empagran
decision "expressly declined to address the issue presented in this case,"
Judge Magnuson then attached significance to Empagran's citation to a
1977 decision from the Southern District of New York.68 In that case, Indus-
tria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitum, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research and Engineering
Co.,69 the district court held "that it had subject matter jurisdiction to decide
a Sherman Act claim based on a foreign injury suffered by a foreign com-
pany., 70 Furthermore, in Empagran the "Supreme Court expressly noted that
the foreign injury in Industria Siciliana was 'inextricably bound up with ...
domestic restraints of trade, and that the plaintiff was injured ... by reason
of an alleged restraint of our domestic trade.' .... Judge Magnuson therefore
concluded that this "[rieference to Industria Siciliana indicates that subject
matter jurisdiction exists when a plaintiff shows that its foreign injury arose
from the domestic effect of the defendant's conduct.
'72
Judge Magnuson next evaluated arguments addressing the level of cau-
sation required to support jurisdiction. The defendants "argue[d] that the
'gives rise to' language in § 6a(2) requires that Plaintiffs show that they
were injured directly and immediately by the effect on United States com-
merce," and that the plaintiffs' global conspiracy theory amounted to "but-
for causation [that] cannot meet the requirements of the FTAIA. 7 3 Judge
65. The alleged anticompetitive conduct in this case involved an international resale price
maintenance scheme, which distinguishes it from the typical facts of the global price-fixing cartel
cases considered in this Note and accounts for its shorter treatment. MM Global Servs. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337, 340 (D. Conn. 2004) (noting plaintiff's allegations of a resale price
maintenance conspiracy). Similarly, this Note will not consider Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v.
Intel Corp. (In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litigation), No. MDL 05-1717-JJF, CIV. A.
05-441-JJF, 2006 WL 2742297 (D. Del. Sept. 26, 2006), which brought the FrAIA's jurisdictional
questions before the court in the context of a section 2 monopoly maintenance claim, likewise dis-
tinguishable from the other linked global conspiracy cases in which the alleged conduct is an
international price-fixing scheme.
66. MM Global Servs., 329 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
67. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. OOMDL1328, 2005 WL 1080790
(D. Minn. May 2, 2005).
68. MSG I, 2005 WL 1080790, at *3.
69. No. 75 Civ. 5828, 1977 WL 1353 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 18, 1977).
70. MSG 1, 2005 WL 1080790, at *3.





Magnuson disagreed. Noting that the plaintiffs' complaint alleged "that their
injury was inextricably intertwined with the injury Defendants inflicted on
the United States market" because "Plaintiffs would have obtained MSG...
from the United States market at competitive prices" had the cartel not af-
fected prices in the United States, Judge Magnuson stated that "[t]hese
allegations aver a far more direct causal relationship ... [than] other cases
where the plaintiffs allegedly suffered foreign injury independent of domes-
tic harm. 74
Judge Magnuson also rejected the defendants' comity-based argu-
ments." Reasoning that because "the Empagran court limited its invocation
of comity to cases where 'foreign conduct ... causes independent foreign
harm and that foreign harm alone gives rise to the plaintiff's claim,'" those
policy concerns were "not present in this case, where Plaintiffs allege that
the foreign harm they suffered was inextricably related to the anti-
competitive conduct's effect on domestic commerce.
' 76
Finally, after brushing aside the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs
lacked antitrust standing, Judge Magnuson concluded that "Plaintiffs have
craftily plead the Amended Complaint to allege a claim based upon the al-
ternative theory recognized by the United States Supreme Court" in
Empagran.77 Denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, he issued an addi-
tional Order that the "parties shall conduct discovery exclusively relating to
the alleged nexus between the domestic effects of Defendants' anti-
competitive [conduct] and Plaintiffs' alleged harm., 78 The MSG I opinion
provided by far the most thorough analysis of the linked global conspiracy
question left open in the wake of Empagran, and it offered a decidedly pro-
jurisdiction answer.
B. Empagran II: The D.C. Circuit Slams the
Door on Foreign Plaintiffs
The initial trend favoring foreign plaintiffs came to an abrupt end just
weeks after Judge Magnuson's opinion in MSG I when the D.C. Circuit is-
sued its opinion in Empagran 179 on remand from the Supreme Court. In a
brief, four-page opinion, the D.C. Circuit flatly rejected the plaintiffs' linked
global conspiracy argument for jurisdiction. The court described plaintiffs'
claims as painting a "plausible scenario" that "super-competitive prices in
the United States might well have been a 'but-for' cause of [their] foreign
74. Id. at *4-5.
75. Id. at *5-7.
76. Id. at *6.
77. Id. at *8.
78. Id. at *8.
79. Empagran, S.A. v. E Hoffman-Laroche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The D.C.
Circuit issued this decision June 28, 2005.
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injury."80 The court then merely asserted that "'but-for' causation between
the domestic effects and the foreign injury claim is simply not sufficient to
bring anticompetitive conduct within the FTAIA," because the "statutory
language-'gives rise to'-indicates a direct causal relationship, that is,
proximate causation."8 Therefore, the "mere but-for 'nexus' the [plaintiffs]
advanced in their brief' could not satisfy the FTAIA and support jurisdic-
tion." Noting the Supreme Court's "prescriptive comity" analysis in
Empagran, the court also reasoned that "read[ing] the FTAIA broadly to
permit a more flexible, less direct standard than proximate cause would
open the door to . .. interference with other nations' prerogative" to main-
tain their own competition regimes.83
Finally, in a single paragraph, the court applied its new "proximate
cause" standard to the case. Stating that the plaintiffs' but-for theory "estab-
lishe[d] only an indirect connection between the U.S. prices and the prices
they paid when they purchased vitamins abroad," the court concluded that
"[i]t was the foreign effects of price-fixing outside of the United States that
directly caused or 'g[a]ve rise to' [the plaintiffs'] losses when they pur-
chased vitamins abroad at super-competitive prices." Thus, the court
divined a "proximate cause" standard from the "gives rise to" language in
FTAIA. It then did little more than summarily label the plaintiffs' allegations
as stating mere "but-for" or "indirect" causation, which failed to meet the
"direct causal relationship" requirement of the new "proximate cause" stan-
dard.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Empagran H marked a clear turning
point. Since then, every court to confront a linked global conspiracy claim
has denied jurisdiction. This count includes Judge Magnuson, who, four
months after Empagran II, granted a Motion to Reconsider his prior deci-
sion, which he then reversed. 85 These four post-Empagran cases-eMag
Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp. ,86 Latino Quimica-Amtex S.A. v. Akzo
Nobel Chemicals B. V,87 In re: Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation
(MSG i)," and In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation
(DRAM) 89-are discussed below.
Although the plaintiffs in eMag advanced particularly strong and de-
tailed claims about defendants' linked global conspiracy in the market for
80. Id. at 1270.
81. Id. at 1270-71.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1271.
84. Id.
85. In re: Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ.00MDLI328, 2005 WL 2810682
(D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005).
86. No. C 02-1611, 2005 WL 1712084 (N.D. Cal. July 20,2005).
87. No. 03 Civ. 10312, 2005 WL 2207017 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 8, 2005).
88. No. Civ.00MDL1328, 2005 WL 2810682 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005).
89. No. C. 02-1486, 2006 WL 515629 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006).
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magnetic iron oxide ("MIO"), the court nonetheless denied jurisdiction. The
eMag plaintiffs made the same arbitrage-style arguments as the plaintiffs in
Empagran and MSG--contending that "if defendants' conspiracy had not
inflated U.S. prices, [they] would not have been injured because lower
American prices would have driven down international prices overall ' ' -
but they added a new twist as well. These plaintiffs pointed out that "be-
cause they had already bought some MIO in American commerce and could
have purchased the rest of their MIO from the U.S. market had it remained
competitive," they would "have been particularly well-suited to replace pur-
chases of MIO in purely foreign commerce with purchases of MIO in
American commerce. ' 9' Their complaint did more than simply posit an
interlinked, fluid global market where buyers theoretically chased the best
price across borders; it claimed that their own buying patterns proved the
existence of such a market. Therefore, these plaintiffs argued that they
should recover both for their purchases in the U.S. market and for their pur-
chases abroad.9
The court was not persuaded. Noting the D.C. Circuit's holding in Em-
pagran II, the court "f[ou]nd that plaintiffs' theory of 'but-for' causation...
is not sufficient to support a claim under the Sherman Act and is inconsis-
tent with the 'gives rise to a claim' language of the FTAIA."93 Puzzlingly, the
court then reasoned that
plaintiffs' proposed theory-pleading a global marketplace where inflated
prices in the United States facilitated inflated prices abroad-would.., al-
low any foreign plaintiff who suffered harm abroad as a result of a foreign
conspiracy to gain access to the U.S. courts and treble damages by making
unsupported allegations of a global marketplace with the possibility of ar-
bitrage pricing, even where there are no allegations of a direct impact on
U.S. commerce. 9'
This argument ignores several key aspects of the case. First, plaintiffs
did allege that the worldwide conspiracy had direct impact on U.S. com-
merce: they alleged that the defendants fixed the price of MIO in the United
States.9 Second, plaintiffs' own purchasing patterns suggested that, had the
conspiracy's scope been less than worldwide, arbitrage in this global market
would have been far more likely than a mere "possibility."96 Finally, the high
likelihood of arbitrage, but for the conspiracy, supplied that necessary link
90. eMag, 2005 WL 171208, at *5.
91. id. at*5,*4.
92. It should be noted that the defendants' motion to dismiss, as well as the court's denial of
jurisdiction, only covered the purely foreign activity. Id. at *8 (noting that plaintiff eMag USA was
"not a subject of this motion to dismiss").
93. Id. at *6.
94. Id. at *8.
95. Id. at *1 ("[Plaintiffs] allege that defendants fixed the price of MIO throughout the
world, including in the United States.").
96. id. at *4-5.
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between the "domestic effect" in the U.S. market (artificially high prices)
and the foreign injury (purchases abroad at artificially high prices). Thus,
the domestic effect, by eliminating the possibility of arbitrage in American
markets, truly did "give rise to" plaintiffs' injuries abroad and should have
sufficed to support jurisdiction in this case.
The court gave a second reason for its result, stating that holding other-
wise "would require district courts to engage in complex[] fact-
determinations of alleged linkages between foreign and domestic injuries."97
The court noted that such complex factual inquiries would fly in the face of
the Supreme Court's "admonition that FTAIA's jurisdictional test should be
capable of being applied 'simply and expeditiously.' ,98
The unique facts before the court in eMag, however, offered an example
of an easy and clear line to draw between cases in which jurisdiction would
be improper and those in which jurisdiction should exist. Evaluating claims
of linked global conspiracies might involve overly complex economic fact
determinations. Thus, a court could properly exercise jurisdiction only
where plaintiffs support their theory of an interlinked, arbitrage-ready global
market with concrete evidence that, absent the alleged global conspiracy,
cross-border replacement purchases would have been very likely. The eMag
plaintiffs' buying history would have provided that evidence, allowing juris-
diction in that case, and yet kept the jurisdictional door only narrowly ajar.
Instead, the court simply followed the D.C. Circuit's lead and dismissed the
case, invoking proximate cause to declare that the plaintiffs' alleged injuries
were not "directly linked" to the "injury to U.S. commerce." 99
In Latino Quimica, the next of these post-Empagran linked global con-
spiracy cases, Magistrate Judge Freeman was similarly "persuaded by the
reasoning of the D.C. Circuit that 'proximate' causation" was the appropri-
ate standard. '°° Most interesting in this opinion were Magistrate Judge
Freeman's strained efforts to distinguish the case before her from the pro-
jurisdiction result reached in MSG L Noting that the MSG plaintiffs "alleged
that the defendants 'included the United States in the cartel precisely to ex-
tract cartel profits from purchasers around the world without risk of
arbitrage,'" she reasoned that "[t]hese allegations ascribe to the defendants
deliberate conduct aimed at the United States" and that those claims were "a
more direct causation allegation than Plaintiffs make in this case, where
Plaintiffs allege a global price-fixing conspiracy, but do not allege that De-
fendants acted to control the U.S. MCAA [monochloroacetic acid] market
for the purpose of furthering their scheme in the foreign markets in which
Plaintiffs operated " '10 ' Magistrate Judge Freeman then stated that the instant
"Plaintiffs merely rely on general market principles to allege that, in a
97. Id. at *8.
98. Id. (quoting F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004)).
99. Id. at 7-8.
100. Latino Quimica-Amtex S.A. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V, No. 03 Civ. 10312, 2005 WL




global market, an effect of anticompetitive conduct in one location ... will
cause a ripple effect... in others. The causal link ... is simply too indirect
to support this Court's subject matter jurisdiction."' '
It seems bizarre that jurisdiction might hinge on whether plaintiffs ensure
that their complaint includes an allegation that defendants intended to cartel-
ize the entire world and expressly included the United States to further this
goal. Indeed, it seems more likely that Magistrate Judge Freeman was pushing
aside contrary case law en route to following Empagran H and denying juris-
diction. Instead of conjuring up a difference without any apparent distinction,
Magistrate Judge Freeman should have confronted MSG I on its merits, rec-
ognized the brewing conflict, and disagreed explicitly with MSG L
Just weeks later, Judge Magnuson issued his opinion in MSG H and, like
Magistrate Judge Freeman, he joined the queue of judges following Empa-
gran H and all but ignored the reasoning of his own MSG I opinion.'0 3 In his
short, three-page opinion, Judge Magnuson devoted three paragraphs to de-
scribing the D.C. Circuit's Empagran H holding that "the 'gives rise to'
language in the FITAIA requires ... a direct causal relationship between the
domestic effects and the foreign injury."' ' Then, in a single paragraph, he
disposed of the case. Noting that "[t]he theory Plaintiffs advance in this case
is identical to that advanced in Empagran [I]," Judge Magnuson stated that
he was "persuaded by the decision and reasoning" of Empagran II, that the
"global price-fixing cartel theory establishes only an indirect relationship,"
and that jurisdiction did not exist because "Plaintiffs are unable to show that
the domestic effect proximately caused their injuries."'0 5 Left wholly unad-
dressed were any of the reasons advanced for the pro-jurisdiction holding in
MSG I, such as the import of the Supreme Court's citation to Industria Sicil-
iana or the "direct causal relationship" Judge Magnuson had found between
the domestic effect and the plaintiffs' injury abroad.' °6
Finally, the Northern District of California in DRAM,'°7 decided in
March 2006, became the fourth member of the growing group of courts de-
nying jurisdiction in the aftermath of Empagran II. The DRAM opinion fits
the post-Empagran H trend: it wielded an array of labels such as "but for,"
"direct," and "proximate cause" to dispatch the case. Stating that the plain-
tiff's global cartel theory "constitute[s] no more than ... 'but for' causation,"
the court employed a "'proximate causation' standard" to dismiss the claim as
lacking jurisdiction because the plaintiff's foreign injury was not "directly
linked to ... the domestic effect."' 8 Aside from these labels, the court in
102. Id.
103. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ.00MDL1328, 2005 WL 2810682
(D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005).
104. Id. at *2-3.
105. Id. at *3.
106. Id. at *3-5.
107. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation, No. C. 02-1486, 2006 WL
515629 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006).
108. Id. at *4-5.
[Vol. 105:779
Keeping the Door Ajar
DRAM offered essentially no analysis or argument why linked global car-
tels, which fix the price of an item in both foreign and domestic markets,
fail to "directly link" foreign injuries to the harmful effects in domestic
markets.
III. THE POST-EMPAGRAN CONSENSUS IS WRONG AND
COURTS SHOULD HAVE JURISDICTION OVER
FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS IN LINKED
GLOBAL CONSPIRACY CASES
While courts now seem aligned in near unanimity against jurisdiction in
linked global cartel cases, the immediate aftermath of Empagran appeared
to offer foreign plaintiffs cause for optimism. Although the tide has turned
against those early decisions, this Part argues that the growing anti-
jurisdiction consensus is wrong. Section III.A criticizes the often conclusory
and ill-reasoned use of proximate cause to dispose of foreign plaintiffs'
claims in global cartel cases, and outlines how courts should conduct the
jurisdictional analysis. Section III.B argues that the FrAIA's legislative his-
tory supports jurisdiction. Section III.C then suggests that antitrust standing
doctrine offers more legally sound grounds on which to dismiss many of
these linked global cartel cases, while Section III.D contends that foreign
plaintiffs may satisfy the requirements for both antitrust standing and juris-
diction.
A. The Post-Empagran Consensus Rests on an Unsound
Use of Proximate Cause and Courts Should Find
Jurisdiction Proper under the FTAIA
In holding that they lack jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs in linked
global conspiracy cases, courts have generally invoked notions of proximate
cause, but they have often used the concept only in a conclusory and unex-
amined manner. 1' The D.C. Circuit's opinion in Empagran 11 epitomizes
this flawed use of proximate cause. Empagran 11 did little more than sum-
marily attach labels like "but-for" and "indirect" to the plaintiffs' global
conspiracy theory. For instance, the court illogically declared that plaintiffs'
theory "establishe[d] only an indirect connection between the U.S. prices
and the prices they paid when they purchased vitamins abroad."' 0 The plain-
tiffs, of course, did not assert only an "indirect connection" between prices
abroad and prices in the United States. Rather, they asserted that those
prices were identical, as a very "direct" result of defendants' global cartel.
Indeed, shortly before describing plaintiffs' theory as "indirect," the court
expressly acknowledged their claim that defendants' global cartel operated
"by fixing a single global price for the vitamins and by ... prevent[ing]
109. See supra Section l.B.
110. Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-Laroche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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bulk vitamins from being traded between North America and other re-
gions.' Given these allegations, the court's "indirect connection"
statement is unreasonable.
The D.C. Circuit was not alone in adopting this faulty reasoning, as
some of the briefing in Empagran H likewise reflected this view of proxi-
mate cause. In their amici brief, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the
Federal Trade Conmission ("FTC") argued that the "gives rise to a claim"
language in the FTAIA should be read in light of the "traditional legal stan-
dard for causation in antitrust law," and that therefore the "proper test is
proximate causation.""' The DOJ and FTC then argued that because the
FTAIA "focus[es] on the domestic effect rather than the challenged conduct
as the basis for the plaintiff's claim, [it] requires a specialized application of
the principles of proximate causation-an application that turns on the con-
cepts of directness and remoteness.""'
The DOJ and FTC's causation analysis, emphasizing "the concepts of
directness and remoteness," conflicts with the Supreme Court's analysis in
Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters (AGC),"4 one of the cases heavily relied upon in their
amici brief. In AGC, a case addressing the requirements of antitrust stand-
ing, the Court likened the difficulty of defining a precise test for antitrust
standing to common-law judges' "struggle... to articulate a precise defini-
tion of the concept of 'proximate cause.' "'5 Given this difficulty, the Court
noted that previous cases provided a number of "factors that circumscribe
and guide the exercise of judgment in deciding whether the law affords a
remedy in specific circumstances."" 6 Importantly, the Court rejected the use
of simple labels such as remote, direct, or operative."7 Instead, the Court
noted that "these labels may lead to contradictory and inconsistent results"
and concluded that "courts should analyze each situation in light of the fac-
tors set forth" in the opinion."8 The Supreme Court's AGC opinion shows
that, contrary to the argument of the DOJ and FTC, causation and proximate
cause analysis should not simply "turn[] on the concepts of directness and
remoteness.""' 9 Instead, it should reflect a nuanced inquiry of each case's
111. Id. at 1270 n.5 (emphasis added).
112. Brief for the United States and the Fed. Trade Comm'n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellees in Response to Court Order of Nov. 22, 2004 at 14, Empagran, 417 F.3d 1267
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 01-7115), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f207700/207757.htm.
113. Id. at 17.
114. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
115. Id. at 535-36 (footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 536-37.
117. Id. at 536 n.33.
118. Id.
119. Although AGC concerned antitrust standing, and not jurisdiction, it remains relevant.
Because its criticism of label-heavy proximate cause analysis referenced common law judges'
struggle with proximate cause in the tort context, it would seem applicable in the jurisdictional
context as well. At the jurisdictional stage, however, the primary relevance of AGC's discussion of
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"specific circumstances," something lacking in Empagran II and the cases
following it.
Linked global cartel cases present circumstances in which courts should
find that the domestic effect of the defendants' conduct "gives rise to" for-
eign plaintiffs' claims, making jurisdiction proper under the FTAIA. In
linked global cartel cases, foreign plaintiffs' claims logically satisfy the
FTAIA's text and jurisdictional standard: by fixing prices worldwide, the
defendants' linked global cartel clearly exerts a direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable effect upon U.S. domestic commerce. Further, the
harmful effect of supra-competitive prices in U.S. commerce prevents for-
eign plaintiffs from engaging in arbitrage, thereby causing their injury-
purchases abroad at inflated prices-and giving rise to their claims.12° As
Judge Magnuson initially recognized, such "allegations aver a far more di-
rect causal relationship between the domestic effect and Plaintiffs' injury
than... Den Norske, and other cases where the plaintiffs allegedly suffered
foreign injury independent of domestic harm.""'2 After all, "'[d]irectness' in
the antitrust context means 'close in the chain of causation,' ,,22 and the rele-
vant links in the chain in global cartel cases are close indeed. The
defendants' conduct-price fixing-sets a single, supra-competitive price
both in U.S. markets and abroad. The existence of supra-competitive prices
in the U.S. market precludes arbitrage and condemns foreign plaintiffs to
paying supra-competitive prices abroad. While certainly "judicial remed[ies]
cannot encompass every conceivable harm that can be traced to alleged
wrongdoing," linked global cartel cases call for very little tracing and there-
fore do not represent a situation in which, because of reasons "'of
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.' ,1
23
B. The FTAIA's Legislative History Supports Finding Jurisdiction
The FTAIA's legislative history and background materials contain sev-
eral passages strongly suggesting that Congress did intend to confer
jurisdiction upon foreign plaintiffs in situations similar to those presented in
the linked global cartel cases. Three passages in particular support this view.
proximate cause is simply to note the Supreme Court's view that causation analysis should involve
more than a series of labels. As argued infra in Section HI.C, a full application of AGC's factors to
the facts in a typical linked global cartel case would likely deny antitrust standing to foreign plain-
tiffs.
120. See Sprigman, supra note 31, at 266-67 (arguing, prior to Empagran II, that the "D.C.
Circuit should find that foreign and domestic injuries are connected, and, on that basis, allow the
suit to proceed" and that "the Empagran decision, had it addressed the issues [in a linked global
cartel case] squarely, would have found jurisdiction").
121. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ.00MDL1328, 2005 WL 1080790,
at *5 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005).
122. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
123. AGC, 459 U.S. at 536-37 & n.34 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y.
339, 351-52 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
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First, the House Report's discussion of deterrence weighs in favor of an
expansive view of jurisdiction. Although Justice Breyer found that the vari-
ous deterrence arguments battled to a draw in Empagran,2 4 the legislative
history suggests that Congress had already declared a victor. The House
Report notes that there are "reasons for preserving the rights of foreign per-
sons to sue under our laws when the conduct in question has a substantial
nexus to this country," reasoning that "to deny foreigners a recovery could
under some circumstances so limit the deterrent effect of United States anti-
trust law that defendants would continue to violate our laws, willingly
risking the smaller amount of damages payable solely to injured domestic
persons."'2 5 The Report states that the FTAIA's domestic effects "test ...
does not exclude all persons injured abroad from recovering under the anti-
trust laws of the United States."'2 6 Admittedly, this portion of the House
Report includes a citation to Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,12 which
considered only whether foreign purchasers (and, specifically, foreign gov-
ernment purchasers) could recover under U.S. antitrust law for purchases at
inflated prices made in the United States. 2 Nonetheless, the broader lan-
guage in the House Report shows that Congress was aware of, and
seemingly approved, the idea that extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
plaintiffs injured abroad would help deter cartels.
Second, the House Report's commentary under the heading "Type of
Domestic impact" indicates that Congress did intend to confer jurisdiction
on foreign plaintiffs injured abroad by conduct that also harmed the domes-
tic market. The Report notes that "the domestic 'effect' that may serve as the
predicate for antitrust jurisdiction ... must be of the type that the antitrust
laws prohibit."'' 29 The Report then explains that this view of "effect" means
that "a plaintiff would not be able to establish ... jurisdiction merely by
proving a beneficial effect within the United States, such as increased prof-
itability of some other company ... when the plaintiff's damage claim is
based on an extraterritorial effect on him of a different kind."' The implica-
tion, therefore, is that jurisdiction would be proper where anticompetitive
conduct causes both the adverse effect in the domestic market and the plain-
124. F. Hoffmann-Laroche v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 174-75 (2004) (stating that the
Court could not determine whether plaintiffs' "side of this empirically based [deterrence] argument
or the enforcement agencies' side is correct").
125. H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2495. While
Empagran cited other portions of this House Report, it failed to consider this language. Indeed, it
appears that the only two federal courts to have cited this language are the D.C. Circuit, in the origi-
nal panel decision in Empagran finding jurisdiction, 313 F.3d 338, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and the
Second Circuit, in Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 403 n.10 (2d Cir. 2002).
126. H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2495.
127. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
128. Id. at 309-10; H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2495 ("Foreign purchasers should enjoy the protection of our antitrust laws in the domestic market-
place, just as our citizens do.").
129. H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at I1, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2496.
130. Id.
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tiff's extraterritorial injury. A second comment in this section of the House
Report states this point even more clearly. Referencing the problems of an
earlier draft, the Report notes that the bill was not
intended to confer jurisdiction on injured foreign persons when that injury
arose from conduct with no anticompetitive effects in the domestic mar-
ketplace. Consistent with this conclusion, the full Committee added
language ... to require that the "effect" providing the jurisdictional nexus
must also be the basis for the injury alleged under the antitrust laws. This
does not, however, mean that the impact of the illegal conduct must be ex-
perienced by the injured party within the United States.'
This language shows that Congress understood that it was opening the
jurisdictional door to foreign plaintiffs seeking recovery for injuries suffered
abroad due to linked global conspiracies. Neither Empagran nor any subse-
quent case appears to have confronted this language, and the failure to do so
weakens the arguments against jurisdiction in linked global cartel cases be-
cause it does not pay proper heed to Congress's expressed intent. 1
Third, testimony from congressional hearings during the drafting stages
of the FTAIA shows that Congress considered and rejected language that
would have expressly limited recovery to persons injured in the United
States. The Business Roundtable supported a rival version of the FTAIA that
would have ensured that defendants faced "antitrust liability only to those
persons injured within the United States by an antitrust violation.'  As an-
other witness put it, this proposed FTAIA language would have "thus ma[d]e
clear that the American antitrust laws do not protect foreign buyers and busi-
nesses as they operate in their own home markets; competitive effects in
foreign markets are the proper subject of foreign, not American, law.', 134 Con-
gress, however, did not enact this version of the F'AIA.'35 Instead, the
131. Id. at 11-12, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2496-97.
132. See Jodi Stanfield, Note, Dependent Injury Based Claims: The Next Step in American
Regulation of Antitrust, 39 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1691, 1709-10 (2006) (arguing that Empagran "pro-
vided a disservice by not citing the House Report's text [on the issue of where the injured party must
experience the impact of the illegal conduct] because other courts have used the same document to
support a contrary conclusion" and that "the Court needed to explain why its reading of the House
Report was different and more correct than the readings by these other courts").
133. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearing on H.R. 2326 Before the Subcomm.
on Monopolies & Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 109, 106-13
(1981) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Martin F Connor, Washington Corporate Counsel, Gen-
eral Electric Co., appearing on behalf of the Business Roundtable); see also id. at 114 (statement of
Rep. Rodino, sponsor of H.R. 2326) (suggesting that the bill would "den[y] foreign purchasers
protection of U.S. trade laws"); Sprigman, supra note 31, at 278 (noting that in enacting the FTAIA
Congress rejected language that "would have prohibited suits by persons injured abroad").
134. Hearing, supra note 133, at 87 (statement of James R. Atwood, Formerly Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary and Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State); see also id. at 91 (noting that
"foreign plaintiffs would be able to invoke American antitrust to frustrate" their domestic govern-
ments' policies under "expansive interpretations of the Sherman Act").
135. The version favored by the Business Roundtable consisted of the following language: the
Sherman Act "shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce with any foreign nation
unless such conduct has a direct and substantial effect on trade or commerce within the United
States or has the effect of excluding a domestic person from trade or commerce with such foreign
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enacted language was far broader, and Congress accompanied this language
with a House Report explicitly stating that the enacted language "d[id] not
... mean that the impact of the illegal conduct must be experienced by the
injured party within the United States."' 36 In sum, the legislative materials
behind the FTAIA contain ample support for reading the statute as reflecting
Congress's understanding that the statutory language conferred jurisdiction
on foreign plaintiffs injured abroad.
C. Antitrust Standing Doctrine Better Addresses Courts'
Reluctance to Hear Linked Global Cartel Cases
As detailed throughout this Note, courts have hesitantly approached
linked global conspiracy claims, often citing concerns about directness, re-
moteness, causation, or generally the appropriateness of an American
antitrust remedy. 37 The doctrine of antitrust standing offers a better solution
to these problems than does denying jurisdiction, especially given evidence
in the FTAIA's legislative history that jurisdiction may be proper in these• 138
circumstances. This Section explains why antitrust standing provides a
better solution.
While courts may have valid concerns about hearing these cases, adopt-
ing an overly strict jurisdictional analysis is not the proper solution.
Although foreign plaintiffs' linked global conspiracy claims seem logically
to satisfy the FTAIA's jurisdictional standard, courts may yet feel some
uneasiness about presiding over such entirely foreign suits. Courts should
then address that discomfort through an analysis of antitrust standing, which
"requires that courts examine the fundamental goals and limits of antitrust
enforcement to assure that the antitrust laws are used to address only those
problems that Congress intended to resolve."' 4 Using the AGC framework to
analyze standing, courts would then consider factors such as whether the
plaintiffs' alleged injury "was the type the antitrust laws were intended to
forestall."'
4'
Using the doctrine of antitrust standing to dispose of foreign plaintiffs,
rather than relying on jurisdiction, would accord with arguments advanced
nation." H.R. 2326, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981) (as reported by Subcomm. on Monopolies & Commercial
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 26, 1981).
136. H.R. REP. No. 97-686 at 11-12, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2496-97.
137. See eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C 02-1611, 2005 WL 1712084, at *8
(N.D. Cal. Jul. 20, 2005) (reasoning that a strict causation requirement is needed to exclude claims
from foreign plaintiffs arising out of conduct having only a tenuous connection to U.S. commerce);
see also supra Section III.A (discussing the emphasis on proximate cause in Empagran II).
138. See supra Section [l.B.
139. See supra Section II.A.
140. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 1440.
141. See, e.g., Aramel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1507 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 (1983)).
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not only by commentators, 42 but also frequently by defendants them-
selves. 14 3 Indeed, a few years prior to Empagran, at least one court adopted
exactly this approach. In Galavan v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,' 44 which
concerned the global citric acid cartel, the court stated it was "persuaded by
the legislative history of the FTAIA ... that subject matter jurisdiction is
appropriate in this case.', 4- After finding jurisdiction, the court then ana-
lyzed and rejected the plaintiff's claim under the doctrine of antitrust
standing.146 Noting that one of the AGC standing factors "requires the Court
to inquire 'whether plaintiff has suffered an injury of the type which the
antitrust statute was intended to forestall,'" the court reasoned that
"[a]lthough plaintiff was injured by the elevated prices of citric acid, its in-
jury is not covered by the antitrust laws because plaintiff was 'neither a
competitor nor a consumer' in the United States domestic market.'' 47 This
antitrust standing reasoning would have likewise supported dismissing the
plaintiffs' claims in cases like MSG, DRAM, and Latino Quimica, as none of
those plaintiffs appears to have alleged that they had ever participated in the
relevant United States markets.
If plaintiffs wind up losing either way, one might ask whether it makes
any difference whether courts describe their inquiry as one examining "ju-
risdiction" or "antitrust standing," but the difference matters for two reasons.
First, as Section III.B argued, Congress apparently understood and accepted
that jurisdiction could extend to foreign plaintiffs injured abroad; therefore,
using the blunt tool of a stringent "proximate cause" jurisdictional analysis
to dismiss all cases frustrates that congressional intent. Second, as Section
IH.D suggests, cases may exist in which foreign plaintiffs satisfy the re-
quirements for both jurisdiction and antitrust standing, and the current
approach thus would improperly dismiss their suits.
D. May Foreign Plaintiffs Meet Both Jurisdictional
and Antitrust Standing Requirements?
This Note has argued that, contrary to the thrust of case law, linked
global cartel cases meet the FTAIA's jurisdictional requirements. It has also
noted that antitrust standing doctrine would nevertheless work to bar many
142. E.g., Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 1440-51 (arguing that, while jurisdiction might exist
for these foreign plaintiffs, antitrust standing doctrine should bar their claims); S. Lynn Diamond,
Note, Empagran, The FTAIA And Extraterritorial Effects: Guidance to Courts Facing Questions of
Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 805, 845-48 (2006) (same).
143. E.g., eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C 02-1611, 2005 WL 1712084, at
*11-12 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2005) (noting defendants' standing arguments and that "[a]ntitrust stand-
ing is an issue separate from the jurisdictional question:' but declining to address them in light of
the holding denying jurisdiction); DRAM, No. C. 02-1486, 2006 WL 515629, at * 5-6 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 1, 2006) (same).
144. No. C 97-3259, 1997 WL 732498 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1997).
145. Id. at *3.
146. Id. at * 3-4.
147. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
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such claims. This Section points to a narrow class of cases in which courts
should find that foreign plaintiffs enjoy antitrust standing to pursue their
linked global cartel claims. Putting the facts of eMag alongside the reason-
ing of Galavan shows how foreign plaintiffs might avoid dismissal of their
claims.
Where foreign plaintiffs allege a pattern of "mixed-purchasing" from de-
fendant-members of a global cartel, as the plaintiffs in eMag alleged,'4 1 their
claims should meet both jurisdictional and antitrust standing requirements.
Mixed purchasing means simply that at some point-perhaps even prior to
the conspiracy's formation or outside the statute of limitations period-
plaintiffs have purchased the product in both foreign and domestic markets.
A pattern of mixed purchasing adds yet more support to the argument that
jurisdiction is proper, and also satisfies antitrust standing concerns.
First, when mixed-purchaser foreign plaintiffs seek full recovery in fed-
eral court in linked global cartel cases, courts should read the FTAIA as
establishing jurisdiction for their claims for the reasons argued above in
Sections IH.A and III.B. But to the extent that courts remain reluctant to
find jurisdiction in linked global cartel cases-perhaps insisting that linked
global cartel theories and arbitrage arguments simply do not state a cause
proximately "giv[ing] rise to" a claim-a pattern of mixed purchasing ought
to satisfy even the strictest of jurisdictional standards. A pattern of mixed
purchasing allows plaintiffs to tell a particularly compelling story about how
the defendants' linked global cartel exerted a worldwide, interdependent
effect that eliminated any possibility of arbitrage and thereby gave rise to
their claims. The plaintiffs' own purchasing history would both offer proof
that arbitrage would likely have occurred absent the conspiracy and assuage
courts' concerns about the directness of the relationship between the foreign
plaintiffs' injuries and the harmful effect of the defendant's conduct upon
domestic commerce. Combined with the legislative history arguments in
Section III.B, this mixed-purchasing story should have convinced the eMag
court that the foreign plaintiffs satisfied the FTAIA's jurisdictional require-
ments. 1
49
Second, antitrust standing doctrine should not bar recovery for mixed-
purchaser foreign plaintiffs because the mixed-purchasing element would
connect these foreign plaintiffs more closely with the domestic market such
that their injuries would more likely be "of the type which the antitrust stat-
ute was intended to forestall."'5 In Galavan, the court held that the plaintiff
lacked standing because the "plaintiff was 'neither a competitor nor con-
148. eMag, 2005 WL 1712084, at *4 (noting plaintiffs' claims that because "they 'bought
MIO in American commerce'" they would "'have been particularly well-suited to replace purchases
of MIO in purely foreign commerce with purchases of MIO in American commerce, if the conspir-
acy had not affected" the prices of MIO in the United States).
149. It bears repeating that the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as well as the court's denial of
jurisdiction, only covered the purely foreign activity. See id. at *8 (noting that plaintiff eMag USA
was "not a subject of this motion to dismiss").
150. Galavan, 1997 WL 732498, at *4 (quotation omitted).
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sumer' in the United States domestic market."'5 However, plaintiffs with a
history of mixed purchasing, like the eMag plaintiffs, would have been con-
sumers in the U.S. domestic market at some point and therefore should
satisfy antitrust standing requirements.'
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Empagran left open far more questions
than it answered. Chief among those questions was uncertainty about the
ultimate fate of foreign plaintiffs' claims seeking recovery in federal court
for injuries suffered abroad. This Note has offered a largely critical exami-
nation of how federal courts have responded to the issues left unresolved in
Empagran. It has questioned the reasoning underlying the growing consen-
sus view against jurisdiction, arguing that the FTAIA does in fact confer
jurisdiction over linked global cartel cases. Further, while acknowledging
the legitimate and weighty concerns motivating the majority view, it has
suggested that antitrust standing doctrine offers a better solution to these
problems than a blanket denial of jurisdiction. With few courts bucking the
emerging consensus, it may be some time before these issues return to the
Supreme Court, although in our increasingly globalized economy, it is
unlikely that the Court will be able to avoid confronting them before too
long. If or when the Court does return to these questions--even if its analy-
sis bears no resemblance to the arguments in this Note-hopefully its
reasoning will be far more rigorous than that seen in the courts so far.
151. Id. at *4 (citing In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd in part
on other grounds, Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 796 (1993)).
152. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 539 (1983) (denying standing and noting that the plaintiff "was neither a consumer nor a
competitor in the market in which trade was restrained").
February 2007]
804 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:779
